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Introduction
 In recent years, Europe has witnessed a dynamic deterioration of its security en-
vironment, while lacking both the political will and the necessary tools of power to counter 
this unfavorable trend. Despite observing these trends and emerging crises, Europe has 
remained unable to forecast strategic shocks such as the Arab Spring or the Ukraine Crisis, 
and remained incapable of managing crises in the European neighborhood (North Afri-
ca, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe). First, the paper provides a brief 
assessment of how the European strategic landscape has evolved since the 2008 financial 
crisis and what impact this had on defense spending across Europe.  I argue that the strong 
limitations on European defense sectors were consequences of simultaneous negative eco-
nomic and political processes, creating a ‘dual spiral of diminishing capabilities’ in these 
domains. The article further examines how it would be possible to break this ‘dual spiral 
of diminishing capabilities’ at a time when not even the Ukraine crisis was a trigger strong 
enough to overturn these negative trends throughout Central and Eastern Europe, and of-
fers a ‘reality check’ of how European countries from the Baltics through the Visegrad Four 
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The dual spiral of diminishing capabilities
 Rapid and dynamic changes in our security environment have characterized the 
strategic context both from within Europe and in the European neighborhood since the 
2008 implementation report of the European Security Strategy. These changes, along with 
new emerging challenges have repeatedly revealed that Europe possesses only limited ca-
pabilities to react and to respond in order to pursue European interests, and to restore 
stability and peace in the European neighborhood, (Blockmans and Faleg 2015) that has 
unfavorably transformed from a ‘Ring of Friends’ to the ‘Ring of Fire’ (Economist, 2014), 
while Europe itself has been shaken by the effects of the 2008 financial and economic crisis 
(CSIS 2012, 3-8.; Larrabee et al. 2012; O’Donnell 2012). 
 Summing up the strategic developments of the period 2008-2013 (before the 
Ukraine conflict) that accompanied an overall scarcity of resources in the European de-
fense sector, one could observe two parallel processes in the political and economic do-
mains, bringing about the degradation of military capabilities and the weakening of the 
military tools of European power. These can be described as the ‘dual spiral of diminishing 
capabilities’ (Csiki, 2014 2-3).
 In the economic domain the self-sustaining process of capability loss is trig-
gered by scarce resources as a consequence of the 2008 crisis, which evolved from a pri-
mary (debt) crisis into a secondary (fiscal-monetary) crisis, bringing about deep societal 
and political consequences in several European countries, especially among Southern and 
Central European ones. Diminishing resources dedicated to the defense sector resulted in 
cutting armament modernization plans, R&D, as well as reducing procurements for na-
tional armed forces even in the short term. The reduced domestic orders and cut contracts 
for weapons systems and defense equipment increasingly forced European manufacturers 
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to turn towards the world market where they face increased competition from the arms 
manufacturers of emerging major powers, while their resources for cutting edge R&D are 
being diminished. 
 As a result, the missing crisis management capabilities – such as strategic en-
ablers – either had not been or have not fully been developed or suffered delays and short-
comings due to lack of the technological background and/or financing. The resulting me-
dium-term loss of military capabilities also limits crisis management capabilities, thereby 
reducing Europe’s ability for both power projection and the assertion of foreign policy 
interests in the European neighborhood (Mölling and Brune 2011).
 In the political domain, the loss of capabilities stems from the interaction of 
internal and external factors. The rapid and dynamic transformation (deterioration) of the 
security environment (emerging crises and new types of threats) resulted in a sustained 
demand for military and civilian crisis management. However, European societies did not 
perceive direct, imminent (military) threats triggered by these areas of regional instability 
and local conflicts. This lack of perceived threats in a time of resource scarcities obviously 
meant that it was difficult to advocate funding defense budgets at a sustainable level (not to 
mention increasing them), when the very same economic crisis turned people’s attention 
towards the non-military dimensions of security. In this period, the economic and social 
dimension of security was brought to the forefront, prioritizing welfare and employment 
issues. In such an environment, the short-term interests of elected political representatives 
(the effective management of the financial-economic crisis) and economic uncertainties 
(the scarcity of resources) overruled long-term strategic planning, necessary for meaning-
ful capability development. The overall consequence of this was the diminishing political 
will and popular support for sacrificing funds for the development of defense capabilities, 
and refraining from a more active foreign policy and involvement in the crisis manage-
ment efforts in the European neighborhood.
 The key factor in these processes is as follows: while the incentives for European 
defense policy are clearly present and accounted for both by the political and military 
elite, short-term necessities and interests almost always overrule the steps necessary for 
medium- and long-term planning and capability development. Thus these two parallel 
downward spirals had triggered the loss of military capabilities even before the Ukraine 
crisis began and the threat of the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (ISIS) emerged in the European 
neighborhood, the same neighborhood which had already been characterized by instabil-
ity and insecurity.
Measuring change – or the lack of it: trends in defense expenditures in Europe
 The effects of the 2008 financial crisis within NATO could be measured, high-
lighting how the increased indebtedness and shrinking defense expenditures have been 
going hand-in-hand in most European countries. If we compare the data from a pre-crisis 
year (2006) with those from the post-crisis period (2012), we can see major increase in 
terms of national debt (74% increase for European NATO members in six years), coupled 
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with a signifi cant decrease in defense spending (-11.8%). Th is has been the case especially 
in Central and Eastern Europe, where the national debts had risen by 92%, while defense 
expenditures shrunk by more than 23% in the period 2006-2012 (Csiki, 2013a 6).
 Th e uneven mid-term burden-sharing patterns within NATO are also alarming. 
If we observe the trends of defense spending for the alliance as a whole since the turn of 
the millennium, we can see that aggregate non-US military expenditures have only in-
creased by about 15% at the height of the period (2009) when the most intensive phase of 
operations in Afghanistan began, and by 2014 have returned to the same level as in 2000 
– despite the eff ects of the Arab Spring, subsequent crises in the MENA region and lately 
in Eastern Europe (SIPRI Military Expenditures Database, 2015).7
7  However, it is worth to note that U.S. defense spending increased to an irregularly high level as a conse-
quence of the 9/11 attacks, fueling the global war on terror, and the high levels of U.S. defense spending have 
also been triggered by the global roles and responsibilities the country undertakes. The expenditure that had 
been higher than Cold War extremes naturally distorted burden-sharing, but the underperformance in this 
regard on behalf of other allies has made the situation even more unbalanced.
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 The unsustainable nature of this unbalanced situation has repeatedly been high-
lighted by various NATO officials over the years – but (maybe) surprisingly the downward 
trend of defense expenditures has not been reversed. Not even when the economic per-
formance of the European countries has stabilized, and following the 2008-2009 recession 
returned to modest growth since 2010. European defense spending in real value has con-
tinued to decrease by more than 13% if compared with the last pre-crisis year, 2007 (Wolf 
2015, 2).
 The Newport Summit of 2014 was hoped to bring the winds of change with 
regards to European defense efforts. Triggered by their changing threat perception, NATO 
members adopted the Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond and the Wales Summit Dec-
laration in September 2014, renewing their commitment to boosting the development of 
military capabilities, and also committing themselves to the ‘defense pledge’ for increasing 
the defense expenditures. Such positive turn has been expected building upon the Defense 
Pledge as a consequence of emerging threats and new challenges in the European neigh-
borhood in the East and South alike (NATO 2014 point 14). Heading towards the Warsaw 
Summit, we are still to see if the political commitment to move member states’ defense 
budgets towards the 2% threshold and provide 20% of the funds for procurement would 
be realized in the mid-term, as follow-up reactions have been varied (Raynova and Kearns 
2015).
 However, we cannot be overly optimistic with regard to defense expenditures 
in Europe for several reasons. The trends within NATO do not support the positive ex-
pectations: despite repeated calls since 2011 when Smart Defense has been initiated, the 
alliance-wide defense expenditure has been shrinking on average. Even though Brussels 
(and Washington) would expect 2% of the gross domestic product to be spent on defense 
by each member state, and the goal after the financial crisis was to keep defense expendi-
ture leveled at least, and then gradually move towards the 2% threshold, we have witnessed 
exactly the opposite trend. In 2006 1.72% of the GDP was spent on defense by the then 26 
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NATO member states on average; in 2010 it was 1.65% by the 28 allies, while in 2014 it fell 
to 1.38 percent – according to the data provided by SIPRI Military Expenditures Database.
 This trend can be observed in the case of the Visegrad countries as well. With the 
exception of Poland, defense expenditures begun to decrease practically from 2005/2006 
on, thus by the end of the 1999-2014 period (since joining NATO) Hungary has nominally 
lost 33% of its defense budget, the Czech Republic has lost 30%, while Slovakia has lost 
24% since its accession in 2004 (SIPRI Military Expenditures Database, 2015).
 The key question remains: can the above trend be reversed in the spirit of the 
2014 Defense Pledge? NATO estimates for 2015 were short of such commitment: not only 
uneven burden sharing, but the downward trend also seems to have persisted throughout 
2015. These estimates – based on current prices in USD 2015 exchange rate – include a 
5.32% decrease for the whole alliance compared to 2014, a 16.02% decrease for NATO 
Europe, with the United States mostly preserving its contribution to defense efforts with 
0.66% decrease in its defense budget (NATO 2015, 4).
Pledges, political commitment and implementation in Eastern 
and Central Europe
 When we examine the follow-up reactions to the Wales Summit decisions in 
the short-term – or we ask the question: to what extent did NATO members fulfill the 
Defense Pledge signed in Newport? On closer look, we get a mixed picture. Clearly, there 
is a major division within the European member states of NATO regarding the extent 
the Eastern Flank versus the Southern Flank should determine defense, deterrence and 
reassurance measures. Driven by diverging threat perceptions (Russia and the Ukraine 
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conflict vs. instability in North Africa and the threat of the ‘Islamic State’ in the Middle 
East) and fueled by weak economic performance, Western and Southern European coun-
tries have shown limited willingness to increase their defense expenditures. Criticism was 
strong especially towards great powers (Germany, France and the United Kingdom), trig-
gering decisions for moderate mid-term increase only (Raynova and Kearns 2015, 2-4). 
The first news of planned meaningful change based on national priorities in Germany 
appeared first in March 2015, planning for an annual 2 billion euro increase beyond 2016 
(Bloomberg 2015). Others, however, were lacking progress.
 The situation has been fundamentally different among the Baltic states, Eastern 
and Southeastern European countries, which as a consequence of perceiving the threat 
of possible Russian activities aimed at the destabilization and ongoing militarization of 
Eastern Europe, began to realize the Defense Pledge already in 2014. Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania have contracted defense procurements for various equipment including tanks, 
missiles, anti-tank weapons, combat vehicles, and others worth more than 300 million eu-
ros, just in 2014. Moreover, Estonia reportedly planned to raise its defense budget to 2.05 
percent of GDP; Lithuania to 1.1 percent from 0.89, while Latvia planned a one percent 
increase in 2015 from its previous 0.91 percent (Telegraph 2014). Lithuania undertook 
significant steps to boost its defense capabilities: strengthened its citizens’ militia to 8,000 
volunteers in 2014, decided to create a 2,500 strong rapid reaction force (Defense News 
2014), and plans to reintroduce military conscription (BBC 2015). Latvia plans to grow 
its military to 6,600 members by 2018 from the current 4,600 and plans to increase the 
number of reservists to 12,000 by 2020 from the current 8,000 (Defense News 2015a). 
Beyond NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence Estonia hosted the first 
NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) in the region and is one of the few countries already 
meeting the 2% target for defense spending in terms of GDP.
 Meanwhile, Central European countries have shown varied reactions to the 
Ukraine conflict and dissent regarding the suitable reactions to Russia’s aggression. On the 
one hand, Poland, with defense expenditures already surpassing 2% of the GDP, has con-
tinued with its defense reform and sustained the momentum of the armed forces’ modern-
ization that had begun in 2009. Voicing strong concerns about the potential threat posed 
by Russia, Poland became a leading force for boosting defense efforts within NATO. Be-
sides investing in high-profile equipment, like a missile shield, anti-aircraft systems, cruise 
missiles, armored personnel carriers, submarines, combat drones, multi-purpose helicop-
ters and others, Warsaw has also attempted to harmonize regional defense cooperation 
efforts with the Baltic states (more successfully) and within the Visegrad countries (less 
successfully) (Defense News 2015b).
 Other Visegrad countries, however, seemed to have perceived events in Eastern 
Europe in a somewhat different manner, seemingly neglecting possible military threats, 
and were less keen on voicing heated anti-Russian opinion. It was telling that unlike before 
the Chicago Summit in 2012, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia did not issue 
a joint V4 declaration with Poland ahead of the 2014 Wales Summit on shared defense 
policy perspectives. But the somewhat diverging perceptions did not mean the break-up 
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of Central European defense cooperation, and gradually the other three members of the 
V4 have also begun to move on a path of strengthening their defense efforts. We may ar-
gue that eventually the deteriorating security environment both in the East and South has 
triggered a response also in Prague, Bratislava and Budapest, providing an opportunity to 
argue for increasing national defense budgets and possibly kick starting the long-neglected 
modernization programs of the armed forces.
 As part of these efforts, the Czech Republic had decided to increase defense ex-
penditures by 0.1 percent of the GDP (4 billion Kč) a year from 2015 on, and the defense 
spending is slated to rise from 41 billion Kč in 2014 to 71.5 billion Kč in 2020 (a 74.4% 
increase in nominal value). What is more, in March 2015, senior government officials an-
nounced that the Czech Defense Ministry was working on a draft bill to restore conscrip-
tion and a decision could be taken in June. In addition to that, plans have been drafted 
to expand the military from the current 16,600 troops to 24,000-27,000 troops by 2025 
(Prague Post 2014; Defense News 2015c). Furthermore, major modernization plans have 
also been adopted, foreseeing the procurement of helicopters, armored vehicles and radars 
– all of them replacing Soviet-era Russian technology with NATO equipment (Defense 
News 2015d).
 Slovakia, on the other hand had remained reluctant to announce the increase in 
defense expenditures for a long time, right until the Wales Summit. In Newport, President 
Andrej Kiska pledged to increase Slovak defense spending to 1.6 percent of GDP by 2020 
and to commit to stemming the drop in spending, in addition to allocating 20 percent of 
the annual defense budget by 2016 for modernizing the Slovak military. Regarding mod-
ernization plans, a fighter acquisition or lease plan (possibly for JAS-39 Gripen) was an-
nounced to replace Russian-made MiG-29s; and UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters are to 
replace Mi-17 helicopters (Globalsecurity 2015; Defense News 2015e).
 Hungary in recent years has succeeded in sustaining its defense expenditure 
at nominal value, and minor increases had been seen since 2013. In accordance with a 
2012 government decision, a 0.1% increase of the defense spending in terms of GDP is 
expected and now planned for from 2016 onwards. During the parliamentary debate of the 
2016 state budget, a request for 298.6 billion Forints has been filed – an increase of 19.2% 
from 2014, but only reaching 0.84% of the GDP forecast for 2015. As mentioned above, 
the government shall provide for additional 0.1% increase in term of GDP in subsequent 
years, moving towards 1.4% of the GDP in the period 2016-2022 (Csiki 2013b, 11). How-
ever, the increases in funding are not dedicated for modernization programs, but to fund a 
new military career model that had been introduced in 2015, thus to providing the funds 
necessary for increased personnel costs. Despite the worn-out condition of many major 
equipment types of the Hungarian Defense Forces, the only meaningful procurement pro-
gram in place addresses the purchase of a number of multi-purpose helicopters, for which 
extra government funds would be provided beyond the planned defense budget (Hungary 
Today 2015).
 Amidst the preparations to adopt a new defense strategy in 2015, Romanian 
parties committed themselves to increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2017 and to 
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maintain it for a decade, until 2027 (Jane’s 2015). Recent armed forces modernization pro-
grams have highlighted developing allied missile defense and completing the purchase of 
tactical transport aircraft, while the upcoming developments will include hosting a NATO 
Force Integration Unit and the Multinational Division South-East Headquarters in Bucha-
rest, which will coordinate military command in Romania and the neighboring Bulgaria. 
The multinational headquarters will open in 2016 and become fully operational by 2018 
(New York Times 2015).
 Due to sustained financial constraints, Bulgaria – another country to host an 
NFIU in the region – is yet to follow the opposite path, reaching the lowest level of defense 
spending in ten years, spending 1.16% of GDP, or 979 million BGN in 2015 (Novonite 
2015). A new development plan for the armed forces is currently under negotiation and 
increasing defense expenses that would allow for major procurements is planned from 
2016 on (Sofia Globe 2015).
Conclusions: breaking the dual spiral of diminishing capabilities
 The alarming trends of declining defense efforts described above as the dual 
spiral of diminishing capabilities – seems to have – changed in the course of 2014 when 
resulting from the two new crises (Ukraine, ISIS), the citizenry and governments across 
Europe alike began to perceive direct and indirect military threats. These threats took 
both symmetric (conventional armed conflict on European soil) and asymmetric forms 
(terrorism, or the threat of Russian-backed destabilization). Regarding the military con-
flict in Ukraine, the Baltic states, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria were the most concerned 
(Bugajski 2014), while regarding the ‘Islamic State’ and terrorism, primarily France and the 
United Kingdom were subjects to perceiving such threats (BBC 2014, Pierini 2014), even 
though warning calls have been issued in almost every European country.
 These examples might have also shown us the possible ways to breaking the dual 
spiral of diminishing capabilities through changing the threat perception: through iden-
tifying direct, imminent or close threats in the military domain. This can be reinforced 
through intensifying political, media and societal discourse about defense matters. If cou-
pled with the necessary support in the economic realm (increasing the defense expendi-
tures), these changes may result in sustainable mid- to long-term strategic planning, boost 
in procurement and R&D, as well as more conscious and better-grounded crisis manage-
ment efforts in the future.
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